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In the last couple of decades we have come to real-
ize that many of our technological advances are having 
serious ecological side effects. We also have become 
aware that much of what we do today will have profound 
effects upon the future. Accordingly, there has devel-
oped, at least in this country, a growing debate among 
philosophers, legislators, and other policy makers 
about our possible obligations to future generations. 
In some instances this debate has resulted in legisla-
tion ascribing certain obligations to our society in 
regard to future generations.1 
In discussing future generations the issue that 
arises is whether we do have obligations to future per-
sons or even whether future generations should be con-
sidered in our moral calculations. On the one extreme 
are people who argue that we owe the future nothing; 
that it is simply a matter of luck as to which genera-
tion we are born and that we have the right to use 
whatever we can regardless of the effects such action 
may have on future persons.2 On the other extreme are 
people who argue that future generations are entitled 
to a polution free environment, vast food reserves, and 
an abundance of natural resources. Of course, in 
between are many variants of these two positions. 
However, many times the authors of these positions do 
not make clear what kinds of obligations are owed to 
future generations or even what is meant by talk of 
future generations. 
It will be the purpose of this paper to clarify 
some of these issues. I intend to show that there are 
several ways to talk about obligations to future gener-
ations and that it can make a great deal of difference 
whether the obligations are to apply to remote genera-
tions or to only immediately succeeding generations. 
In the first part of the paper, I will argue that we 
have a general duty not to harm either remote or imme-
diately succeeding generations. In the second part, I 
will show that there are certain obligations created or 
grounded by the rights to well-being of future persons. 
Here, it will make a great difference which generations 
we are talking about and the kinds of actions to be 
performed. In the third part of the paper, I intend to 
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show that present generations have obligations regard-
ing certain values only to immediately succeeding 
generations. Here the notion of social contract rights 
will be quite important, i.e., rights which guarantee 
certain things that are valued in a specific society.;' 
It has been suggested by various philosophers that 
future persons have no rights and,thus, we have no cor-
relative obligations to them because future persons do 
not (now) exist. They analogize to dead persons who, 
they claim, have no rights because of their non-
existence. I think, however, that these philosophers 
have misconstrued the basic reason why we normally do 
not have obligations to the dead. It is not because of 
their non-existence that they have no rights; rather, 
it is that we cannot perform any actions which affect 
the dead. We cannot injure or kill them, we cannot 
destroy anything they need, we cannot fail to do any-
thing for them, except in the sense of failing to act 
according to their wishes that they had expressed while 
alive, e.g., failing to follow their will. The reason 
is obvious: they are in the past and our actions are 
directed toward the future. Thus, unless one holds 
what I perceive to be a perverted view of causation 
(i.e., backward causation),4 it is clear that none of 
our actions are causal factors in regard to the dead. 
Does this analysis transfer over to future persons? 
I think the answer is evident. We can affect future 
persons in many ways and, thus, our actions can be 
causal factors in regard to them. This illustrates why 
there are good reasons to deny that we have obligations 
to the dead, but affirm that we may have obligations to 
the future. The concept of an obligation presupposes 
that we can causally affect some situations. For exam-
ple, if I have an obligation not to kill Jones, it is 
presupposed that I can in fact kill Jones. This is 
just a restatement of Kant's famous "ought implies 
can." Accordingly, if Jones is already dead it makes 
no sense to say that I have an obligation not to kill 
him. However, if Jones is yet to be born, it may or 
may not make sense to say that I have such an 
obligation. It all depends on what action is to be 
performed. If J perform Action A which results in some 
Consequence B which occurs after Jones is born, and 
Consequence B does in fact kill Jones, does it not make 
sense to say that I killed Jones? Since Jones will be 
a human being when born, and since I have a general 
obligation not to kill human beings, have I not vi-
olated this obligation by performing Action A? As we 
shall see shortly, the answer to this question will 
depend upon such factors as intent and foreseeability. 
The main point now, however, is that simply because 
Jones does not yet exist is not sufficient to deny that 
we have obligations to Jones with respect to his future 
existence. 
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An objection may be made that although there can be 
causal connections between the present generation and 
future generations that it still does not make sense to 
ascribe rights to future generations because future 
persons cannot claim or enforce these rights against 
the present generation—no one will be in existence 
against whom the future persons can make their claim. 
This, however, confuses having a right with having a 
remedy. For example, if I promise to give some object 
X to you upon my death, it would seem that this would 
give you a right to X. It also creates an obligation 
on my part to ensure that I keep X so that it can be 
given to you upon my death. If I destroy X before my 
death, then it seems that I have violated your right to 
X, and that is precisely what you would say upon my 
death, even though there would be nothing you could do 
about it at that time. However, the fact that you 
would have no remedy does not detract from the fact 
that I had the obligation, which could have been en-
forced against me while I was alive, even though your 
right to X could not be exercised until my death. 
Another example: assume that some underprivileged 
and starving country can conclusively show that its in-
habitants are entitled to certain basic goods that our 
country possesses (for example, suppose that it can 
show that our country had stolen these goods at some 
point in history from this country), but that this 
country is totally powerless to do anything about as-
serting or enforcing this right. Surely we do not want 
to say that this right creates no obligation on our 
part simply because it, as a practical matter, cannot 
be enforced against us. Rather, as often is the case, 
persons in our country would act as "proxies" for the 
inhabitants in the underprivileged country, ascertain-
ing their rights for them. Likewise, it seems to make 
perfect sense to say that if the rights of future per-
sons are recognized in the present generation, then 
"proxies" can claim and enforce these rights for these 
future persons.5 
To gain an understanding of what rights future gen-
erations may have and what obligations we have to them, 
it is necessary to analyze what rights and obligations 
it makes sense to ascribe to human beings in general. 
Here I use the term "right" in the sense used by 
authors such as Dworkin, Nozick, and Rawls.6 These 
authors all derive the concept of right from the idea 
that human beings are autonomous, rational creatures, 
which creates in others the obligation either to re-
frain from interfering in the lives of, or to provide 
for, these creatures.7 The extent and specificity of 
these rights, and even the conception of human beings 
itself differs greatly in these writers. (Compare 
Nozick's conception to Rawls' and Dworkin's.) The 
basic point upon which all rely, however, is that there 
is a fundamental connection between rights and 
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rational, autonomous beings that creates or grounds 
obligations in others. 
Consequently, by "obligation" I mean something 
others owe to someone as a result of a right that some-
one has. I do not, however, hold that all obligations 
create correlative rights. 1 have many obligations of 
which it would make no sense to say that someone has a 
right againt me to fulfill that obligation, e.g., 
duties of beneficence, obligations of my office, etc. 
I do not take any position as to the relative 
weight these rights and obligations should be accorded in relation to present rights and obligations, although 
they must be accorded some weight if they are to mean 
anything at all. I do assert, however, that violations 
of these rights and obligations constitute a wrong that 
to be justified must be overridden by some other right 
or obligation. 
As I alluded to above, rights talk, and correspond-
ingly, obligation talk can be broken down into three 
basic categories. First, there are the autonomy rights 
posited by Locke, Kant, and most recently by Robert 
Nozick. These are negative in character in that they 
obligate one not to harm another in his "life, liberty, 
or possessions." Second, there are rights to well-
being, which can be both negative and positive. They 
are negative in the sense Unat persons have a right not 
to have their basic goods or the opportunity to have 
basic goods destroyed. However, they are also positive in the sense that if one does not have access to Basic 
goods, others have a duty to provide him with such 
basic goods. The third category is social contract 
rights, which are all positive in character. These are 
rights to goods which are valued within a certain 
society or institution. They are positive because 
society guarantees that such goods will be provided to 
each individual in the society. For example, the right 
to counsel is a social contract right because our 
society guarantees that each person will be provided 
with legal counsel in a criminal trial.8 
I think by looking at various cases we will see 
that, with respect to present generations, future gen-
erations (both remote and immediate) have negative 
rights, but that only the immediately succeeding gener-
ation has positive rights. It should be noted that the 
distinction between positive and negative rights is 
somewhat controversial. For example, Henry Shue argues 
that the distinction is spurious, because, for in-
stance, the negative right to be free from harm 
requires many positive social institutions (e.g. police 
force, courts of laws, etc.) to make the right 
effective.9 Thus, he argues, the right to be free from 
harm is not really negative after all. I think, how-
ever, that all this shows is that in certain instances 
the abstract negative right will take on positive 
characteristics when institutionalized within a spe-
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cific society. It does not mean that in the absence of 
social institutions human beings do not have the nega-
tive right to be free from harm. 1 will now show what 
this basic right entails when applied to future 
generations. 
1. AUTONOMY RIGHTS 
To begin, I will analyze a case where our society 
performs actions which affect "strangers" in another 
country, i.e., persons with whom we have no direct 
relationship. Suppose we decide to send a missile at 
this country, killing many of its inhabitants. 
(Suppose our reason is to prevent the Russians from 
taking over this mineral-rich country). Since these 
inhabitants are human beings, they clearly have a right 
not to be killed. Thus, our act violates this right 
and we have a duty not to perform it. 
If we move to future individuals, does the situa-
tion change in any relevant aspect? I think not. 
Suppose we would send a satellite into space which 
would be detonated in 200 years killing many of earth's 
inhabitants at that time. (The reason given for doing 
this is that the satellite is designed to detonate over 
Russia and thus we think it will be to our military ad-
vantage to perform the action). Surely we have vi-
olated those persons' right to life. They no doubt 
will be human beings like the "stangers" in the other 
country. If so, then they will have a right to life 
which cannot be infringed upon. Our action of sending 
the satellite into space directly results in such an 
infringement, and thus, our action is wrong, so long as 
there is a causal connection between our action and the 
harmful result.10 
One response to these cases could be that the 
reason that the actions are wrong is that they were 
done with bad intent. What if the action performed is 
not done with the intent to harm anyone per se, but 
rather is done to either alleviate harm or to acHieve a great benefit to us. For instance, suppose that we 
decide to get rid of our nuclear waste problem by send-
ing it all to the "strangers" in the other country. We 
send it in such a way that we have taken all the pre-
cautions we could to reduce the risk created to the 
other country, but obviously the risk that harm to its 
inhabitants will result is still quite high. Suppose 
also that the country is small and powerless to do any-
thing about our action. Could we possibly justify such an action on the grounds that the risk created is 
outweighed by the benefits to us? The answer is no. 
As D.A.J. Richards has shown, 1 1 an action which im-
poses great risk upon unconsenting human beings who 
receive no benefit by the action, but all benefit is 
received by the actors who bear no risk, cannot be 
justified, because it violates the rights to life, to 
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be free from harm and, no doubt, to be free to choose 
how one wants to live one's life. 
Under traditional risk-benefit analysis, for an 
action to be justified the benefits received must 
outweigh the risks imposed. Also, the class of persons 
who receives the benefits must also bear at least part 
of the costs of the action and the class bearing the 
cost must consent to the action. For instance, driving 
automobiles and flying airplanes are risky endeavors. 
However, in our society we have determined that the 
benefits received by the society outweigh the risks 
created. Even so, we do not normally require people to 
get into cars or airplanes without their consent. In 
the case above neither of these conditions are met. 
The "strangers" in the other country reap no benefit 
from our actions and certainly they have not consented 
to the action. Therefore, I submit, the action is 
clearly wrong. 
If our society could show that we have no choice in 
the matter, i.e., it is either us or them, then we 
could at least argue that although the act is regretta-
ble, it may be permissible. However, if the risk 
created is of our own doing, even this argument proba-
bly will not suffice. 
If we apply these principles to future generations, 
will we come to the same conclusions? For instance, if 
we bury radioactive waste in salt mines predicting cor-
rectly that it will be safe for at least two hundred 
years, have we done anything wrong? Suppose that after 
two hundred years there is great risk that the waste 
will seep out, possibly killing and injuring many 
people. Since these persons bear all the costs of our 
action and we receive all the benefits, there is good 
reason to conclude that the action is not justified. 
In addition, these future persons certainly have not 
consented to our action. 
If our generation could show that the production of 
these wastes is absolutely necessary for our survival, 
then we could possibly justify such an action. If our 
generation does not survive, then there will be no 
future generations upon which to impose risks. There-
fore, it can be argued that future generations would 
receive benefit from these actions by making it possi-
ble for them to exist. 
However, as several philosophers, such as Fein-
berg, 1 2 have noted, "future persons" cannot be said to 
have a right to be born. If they do not come into be-
ing, our choice not to produce nuclear waste would vi-
olate no one's rights in the distant future, simply 
because if no one has a right to be born and if no one 
is born, then there will be no one whose rights could 
be violated.13 On the other hand, the production of 
wastes may allow us to survive and make it possible for 
future generations to come into being, but that produc-
tion will also violate the rights of those future per-
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sons because of the great risk and harm that the wastes 
would cause. Thus, if one considers only the rights of 
future generations in analyzing this argument, it would 
seem that the moral thing to do is not to produce any 
long-term wastes because that way we can ensure that 
future generation's rights will not be violated. (Of 
course, depending upon the factual circumstances either 
action could violate the rights of the present 
generation. On the one hand, the risk of seepage now 
may be too great. On the other hand, not using nuclear 
power may have disastrous economic and social 
consequences.) 
Our generation could modify its survival argument 
to say that producing waste is not essential for sur-
vival, but is essential for there to be adequate goods 
produced for the future. If such goods are produced it 
will benefit future persons, thus our previous prin-
ciple does not hold. This is a technological and 
economic argument which depends upon many factual 
assumptions. To analyze it fully, if we could, would 
take us far beyond the scope of this paper. The main 
point, however, is that our generation would have the 
burden of proving that future persons do receive bene-
fits which outweigh the costs imposed upon them. Even 
if we were successful in doing this, we would still 
have to overcome the problem of the non-consent of the 
future persons. Accordingly, I think it is reasonable 
to conclude that we have a prima facie obligation not 
to produce such wastes.14 At the very least we have to 
take seriously the effects such an action has on future 
persons. 
Interestingly, in this area our obligation to 
remote generations may be greater than our obligation 
to immediately succeeding generations. With the latter 
much better arguments can be made that they receive 
some benefit from our actions without bearing much 
cost. (If nothing else, the waste will be buried dur-
ing their lifetime.) In addition, there is a good 
chance that the social instiutions in existence now 
will carry over to them and, thus, the benefits reaped 
by the present institutions should also carry over. In 
other words, with immediately succeeding generations 
the odds are much better that our "no benefit—all 
cost—no consent" principle will not apply; rather, it 
is much more likely that traditional risk-benefit 
analysis will apply, since many of our actions have a 
direct effect upon the immediately succeeding genera-
tion. 
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2. RIGHTS TO WELL-BEING 
If human beings have certain negative rights (e.g., 
right to life and to be free from harm) because they 
are autonomous rational beings, then do they have the 
right to the basic goods necessary to be autonomous and 
rational? Philosophers have given different answers to 
this question. Libertarians, such as Robert Nozick, 
argue that one only has a right to strive for these 
goods, because requiring others to provide them would 
violate peoples' rights, such as the right to property 
and right to liberty. Other philosophers, predominan-
tly influenced by Rawls, have argued that human beings 
have a right to be provided with such goods because 
without them they could not exercise any other rights, 
including those the Libertarians believe are basic. 
For example, if one cannot obtain food to live, one 
certainly cannot go about appropriating property or 
exercising any other freedoms. 
We have seen that future generations have the 
various negative autonomy rights attributable to pre-
sent persons. Does this mean that they also have 
rights to basic goods if they cannot be autonomous 
without these goods? If present persons do not 
preserve goods necessary for the well-being of future 
persons, are the rights of these future persons 
violated? Can we not argue that they are being harmed 
in much the same way as they would be harmed by our 
direct interference? This is an ambiguous question 
because there are two ways that someone can be without 
basic goods. A person can be without basic goods 
because other persons leave him alone and refrain from 
providing him with any of the goods. However, a person 
can also be without basic goods because of (directly as 
a result of) actions of others. For instance, if we 
would poison the only water hole in town, we certainly 
would be harming directly the persons who need this 
water. However, if every water hole naturally dries up 
except mine, 1 may not have an obligation to provide 
these same persons with water. To have such an obliga-
tion I at the very least would have to have enough 
water for my own purposes and thus, giving up of my 
water would not cause me to suffer. (Unless, that is, 
some institutional arrangement has been set up and 
agreed explicitly or implicitly upon by all parties, 
which is designed to take care of such disasters. For 
instance I, with the only remaining water supply, may 
have agreed to or participated in an arrangement where 
the agreed upon procedure was that one would share 
their water with others in the community in times of 
drought, if one could spare any water.) Thus, it makes 
a great difference why someone is without basic goods. 
The following case may help us to see this distinc-
tion better. Suppose there is a group of islands along 
an ocean current, each island having at least one in— 
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habitant.15 Each islander knows of the existence and 
location of the other islands and knows that they are 
inhabited. Suppose also that the first islander along 
the current develops a system of catching fish, which 
is the major source of food for him and, as far as he 
knows, for the islanders down the current. What obli-
gations does he have in regard to how many fish he uses 
and how many are allowed to pass on down the line? 
Assume that his fish catching ability has gotten quite 
sophisticated to the point of being able to catch as 
many as he wishes. If he catches more than he needs, 
because this is much easier than catching some and let-
ting a lot more pass through, has he done anything 
wrong with respect to the other islanders? If so, 
which islanders? It seems clear that if he could let 
some more pass, say enough to sustain the immediately 
adjacent island, without much inconvenience to him, he 
is under an obligation to do so. But it would also 
seem that he would be under such an obligation even if 
it caused him guite a bit of difficulty. He knows that 
fish are necessary for the survival of his neighboring 
islanders. If a person has a basic right to the things 
needed for survival, then if the first islander can al-
low such goods to pass on without depriving himself of 
those basic goods, then he is under an obligation to do 
so. It simply will not do for the first islander to 
complain that this would mean he could not do some of 
the other things he enjoys doing such as reading book's, 
taking hikes, and other such pleasures. However, if it 
required him to virtually spend all of his time at the 
fish catching operation, his obligation to pass on the 
fish may be overridden. The strength of an obligation, 
therefore, depends on the amount of sacrifice required 
of the individual. One does not have to become a slave 
even if that means that others* rights to well-being 
will not be satisfied. 
If we apply this analysis to future generations, it 
would seem that we have the following principle: the 
present generation has an obligation not to perform ac-
tions which will prevent the immediately succeeding 
generation from having access to the basic goods it 
needs for survival, unless this obligation imposes ex-
treme hardship and sacrifice on the present generation. 
This obligation would seem to be even stronger than it 
was in regard to our island example. The separate 
islanders are independent persons who have no real con-
nection between each other; whereas the immediately 
succeeding generation does have connection with u s — 
they are our children. 
Is the above principle sufficient to handle cases 
dealing with all future generations; or are there 
still further obligations based upon the rights to 
well-being of remote generations, which cannot be ex-
plained simply by appealing to obligations to our imme-
diate successors? 
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Suppose in our island case the first islander could 
without too much difficulty catch all the fish he wants 
and still let enough fish pass through to fulfill the 
needs of his immediate neighbors. However, his fish 
catching methods kill so many fish that the remote 
islanders will not have the opportunity to catch fish. 
This results in much suffering due to a lack of basic 
goods. There simply is not enough food on their 
islands to sustain them. If the first islander would 
change his methods to allow more fish to pass through, 
these remote islanders would be able to live a satis-
fying life. But under the present methods, they live 
out a meager existence. Surely we would say that the 
first islander has an obligation to let more fish pass 
through, especially when the extra fish caught are 
wasted. 
The same analysis carries over to remote future 
generations. If our generation would destroy basic 
goods to the extent that only our immediately succeed-
ing generation will have access to these goods, we 
would be forced to conclude that the rights to well-
being of the remote generations were being ignored. 
For instance, suppose by a combination of intensive 
energy exploration, rapid encroachment by overpopulated 
cities upon rural agricultural land, and pollution of 
the air and water, we destroyed most of the good agri-
cultural land to the extent that only our immediate 
descendants could be ensured of having their basic 
needs of subsistence satisfied. This would mean that 
some remote generations would be denied a decent life, 
because they would not be able to obtain even the most 
basic goods, i.e., food. Surely their condition can be 
causally traced back to our actions and we would be 
rightly held accountable (even though as a practical 
matter they could do nothing to us). 
It would seem, therefore, that we have to modify 
our original principle to the following: the present 
generation has an obligation not to perform actions 
which will prevent either immediate or remote genera-
tions from having access to the basic goods it needs 
for survival, unless this obligation imposes extreme 
hardship or sacrifice on the present generation. 
Now the question we turn to is whether the rights 
to well-being of future generations, either remote or 
immediate, ground obligations in the present generation 
to take positive actions to provide basic goods beyond 
the negative obligations to refrain from performing ac-
tions which prevent future generations from obtaining 
the basic goods. Suppose in our island example that 
there simply is not enough fish to sustain anyone else 
but the first islander. Thus, if the first islander 
uses the fish for his subsistence, as he no doubt has a 
right to do, islanders down stream will not have enough 
or any food to eat. However, the first islander could 
with some minimal effort create spawning beds, which 
292 
before long would provide an ample supply of fish to 
the islanders down current. Is he obligated to do so? 
Many philosophers would answer yes to this question 
on the grounds that each islander has a right to 
equality of opportunity.16 They would argue that since 
the first islander no more deserves the fish than any 
other islanders, he has a duty to provide the others 
with the same opportunity, if he possibly can. Thus, 
since he can "reproduce" the fish, he is obligated to 
do so. But to whom is he obligated? Suppose it is im-
possible for him to produce enough fish for all of the 
islands, but that he can produce enough for the next 
island without too much sacrifice to himself. Surely 
it does not make sense to say he is obligated to pro-
duce fish for the more remote islands. One cannot be 
obligated to do what one cannot do. However, since he 
did receive his fish supply more or less by his lucky 
position, he should have to provide for others who were 
not fortunate enough to be in his position, if he can. 
Thus, he is obligated to produce fish for the immedi-
ately adjacent island. He is not obligated, however, 
to produce more than enough for this island, even if he 
could. Since the adjacent island can do what he did, 
the obligation to the next succeeding island transfers 
to the adjacent island. If he does produce more than 
what is needed, he has done a supererogatory act, not a 
morally required act. One does not have to make addi-
tional sacrifices in order to ensure that others will 
satisfy their obligations or that the recipients of 
these obligations will have their rights satisfied. 
For example, if 1 employ someone, I am obligated to pay 
him a decent wage so that he can get his basic goods. 
This does not entail, however, that I also have an 
obligation to provide the basic goods to persons to 
whom he is obligated, e.g., his family, if he fails to 
do so. (However, the society as a whole may have an 
obligation to provide such basic good to those within 
the society who cannot obtain them.) In other words, I 
may have an obligation to A to provide A's basic goods; 
A has an obligation to B to provide B's basic goods. 
But this is a non-transitive operation, and thus, I do 
not have an obligation to B to provide B's basic goods. 
Applying the principle to future generations,•we 
can see that we have obligations to provide the oppor-
tunity to obtain basic goods to the immediately suc-
ceeding generations. However, we are not required to 
make additional sacrifices to provide basic goods for 
the generations they are obligated to. In other words, 
we need to "pass on" only what was provided for us when 
we came into being. Like the island case, it probably 
does not even make sense to talk about providing for 
remote generations. There are too many things that in-
tervening generations could do to upset whatever ac-
tions we took to provide for remote generations. It 
thus seems much more reasonable to only reguire our 
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generations to provide the same opportunities to the 
immediately succeeding generations, and to let them 
worry about the generations after that, especially when 
any other action would require great sacrifice on our 
part. It may be nice of us to make these sacrifices, 
but it cannot be morally required.17 
3. SOCIAL CONTRACT RIGHTS 
It should be obvious from the analysis in the last 
section what I intend to argue about social contract 
rights, which are totally positive in character. Since 
they are of this character, they only exist within a 
certain specific society. For instance, in our society 
we have determined that wilderness areas are valuable 
and should be preserved. Does this mean that human be-
ings cannot exist without wilderness area? Of course 
not. People have no doubt spent their whole lives in a 
city without ever seeing the wilderness. It does mean, 
however, than many human beings find wilderness to be 
quite important to them, and thus, our society has con-
cluded that such areas should be "guaranteed" to exist 
for their use and enjoyment. These people will instill 
this interest into some of their children who will also 
want wilderness areas to exist for their use and 
enjoyment. Thus, it makes sense to say that the imme-
diately succeeding generation has a right. to 
wilderness. However, it should be obvious that it 
would not make sense to say that remote generations, 
e.g., 500 years from now, have a right to wilderness. 
Following Golding,'* these individuals are not part of 
our "moral community" and may not share our "social 
ideals." 
Martin Krieger19 has argued that wilderness atti-
tudes are conditioned by society, and thus in the 
future it may be that no such attitudes exist. If so, 
no one's rights will be violated, if there are no 
longer any wilderness areas at that time, unless, of 
course, the wilderness is cut down during a generation 
which did in fact value it. 
From this analysis we can see that social contract 
rights only apply to contemporaries or the immediately 
succeeding generation. They do not apply to remote 
generations for the simple reason that none of the 
social connections exist which are presupposed by such 
rights. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have tried to argue the general 
thesis that both remote and immediately succeeding gen-
erations have negative rights which give rise to obli-
gations to them in our generation including the nega-
tive obligation not to destroy access to basic goods. 
I then argued that the positive right, i.e., rights to 
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have basic goods provided, and social contract rights 
only apply to the immediately succeeding generation. 
Since many of our actions affect the immediately suc-
ceeding generation, it follows that our generation must 
take seriously all these rights and act accordingly. I 
have also shown that even in situations where our ac-
tions may not affect the immediately succeeding genera-
tion, but may have profound effects on people in the 
distant future, that we are obligated to take these 
latter effects into account when deciding what course 
of action to follow. This is the minimum that justice 
requires, if our descendants are to have any hope of 
attaining a quality of life comparable to ours. To do 
any less is to fail to take the rights of future per-
sons seriously. 
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Ü.S.C. 1131 (1965). 
2As long ago as 1909, Secretary of Interior Henry 
Taller argued this. Recently, the new Secretary, James 
Watt, seems to suggest similar arguments. See, e.g., 
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Harvard University Press, 1971); Ronald Dworkin, Taking 
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York: Basic Books, 1974). 
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the natural right to be treated fairly. See Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, p. 341; H. L. A. Hart, "Are There 
Any Natural Rights," Philosophical Review, 64 (1955), 
175-191. 
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Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press," 1971).' For an excellent discussion of the 
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gories, see Jeffrey G. Murphy, "Rights and Borderline 
Cases," Arizona Law Review 18 (1978): 228-241. Most 
importantly, however^ Tor the point to be made here, 
autonomy rights and rights to well-being exist 
independently of any particular social institutions, 
and in fact, it is these rights which are used to test 
the justness of a society's institutions. With purely 
social contract rights, however, it is only the partic-
ular values present in a given society that give rise 
to such rights. 
9See Henry Shue, Basic Rights, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 198Ö). 
l oThe question of foreseeability arises here. If 
it is foreseeable that someone's rights could be vi-
olated, then the action should not be performed, even 
though it is possible that the bad consequences will 
not occur because of an intervening cause or event. We 
simply take the rights of persons too seriously to al-
low actions to be performed that would violate those 
rights on the chance that an intervening cause may oc-
cur which would prevent the violation from happening. 
See generally William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts (St. 
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 236-289. 
1 1 D . A. J. Richards, "Contractarian Theory, 
Intergenerational Justice and Energy Policy," Energy 
and the Future, ed. Douglas Maclean and Peter G. Brown 
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(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), pp. 131-
12Feinberg, p. 148. 
, 3This argument raises an interesting question. If 
the present society simply wished to do whatever it 
wanted to the environment, food supply, etc., it could 
do so by simply devising a plan by which no future gen-
erations would come into being (at least at some 
point)—a universal sterilization program would do. As 
noted above, I do not think this could be analyzed as 
wrong by appealing to the rights of future persons 
(although any such program may at some point violate 
the rights of present persons, e.g., the right to bear 
children.) Intuitively, however, there does seem to be 
something wrong about such a plan—perhaps it is simply 
the callous disregard for the human species and its 
history. This example illustrates that, as in most is-
sues in morality, one theory or cluster of concepts may 
not be sufficient to deal with the full ramifications 
of the issue, and thus, the rights-theory from which I 
have been arguing will no doubt need to be supplemented 
in some way. That however, is another paper. 
1 41 have ignored any problems concerning the iden-
tity or number of future persons who would be affected. 
Concerning this issue, Derek Parfit has forcibly argued 
that decisions about major social policies such as the 
use of nuclear power would cause different individuals 
to come into existence depending upon which policy is 
chosen. See Derek Parfit, "Future Generations, The 
Identity Problem," in Energy and the Future ed. Douglas 
Maclean and Peter G. Brown (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1983), p. 116-179. He argues that we 
cannot really harm future persons by producing waste 
because if we had not chosen to use nuclear power other 
individuals would have existed in their place. 
I have several problems with this argument, not the 
least of which being Parfit's assumption that for all 
these future individuals it is better for them to have 
existed, irrespective of their quality of life or of 
the harm suffered by them, than never to have existed 
at all. I am also troubled by the theory of human 
behavior or action theory that is presupposed by 
Parfit's arguments. It is not at all clear to me that 
decisions such as the use of nuclear power will have 
such a great deterministic effect upon the identity of 
those who come into existence in the future. In any 
case, with respect to the point I make here, these pro-
blems can be ignored. As I showed earlier, it we adopt 
a rights-based thesis, it is clear that performing 
certain actions, e.g., producing nuclear waste, will 
violate the rights of the persons who do exist in the 
future. If for any reason these individuals do not 
297 
come into existence, no rights are violated. 
Therefore, from this perspective they are not "worse 
off" by not ever existing. 
l sThis example was originally suggested by Robert 
Nozick in his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New 
York: Basic Books,'1974), p. 185 and modified by Brian 
Barry in his article, "Justice Between Generations," in 
P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz, Law, Liberty, and Morality, 
Essays in Honor of H. L. A. Hart, (Oxford: Oxford 
Press, 1977)", p. 273. 
l 6See Richards, p. 15; also Brian Barry, 
"Intergenerational Jusitce in Energy Policy," in Energy 
and the Future, ed. Douglas Maclean and Peter G. Brown 
^Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), pp. 15-30. 
, 7This category of rights may cause a parting of 
the ways between persons adopting a Nozickian viewpoint 
as opposed to a Rawlsian/Dworkinian viewpoint. 
However, it does not seem that this is necessarily so. 
Although within a given society, Nozick would argue 
that no one can be made to provide goods, even basic 
goods, to others if one's goods were appropriated legi-
timately, it does not appear that he is committed to 
saying that this is so when we are talking about 
separate and distinct societies. This would seem espe-
cially the case when we are only talking about provid-
ing the opportunity to obtain basic goods, not provid-
ing the basic goods themselves. If we have done noth-
ing to create the opportunity, but rather it is given 
to us by simply being born into a certain society, 
Nozick may well agree or at least, given his acceptance 
of the Lockean Proviso, he may be forced to agree, that 
we have an obligation to pass on the same opportunity 
to another society or generation. See Nozick, pp. 174-
182. But see ibid, at p. 185, 235-239. See also 
Barry, "Justice Between Generations," pp. 272-273. 
Nozick certainly adheres to the view that one can-
not appropriate some basic good thereby making others 
worse off, or if one does, then one is obligated to 
compensate the others, thus bringing them back up to 
the "baseline." In this sense the providing of basic 
goods is required as a result of an underlying harm, 
i.e., by our appropriation of goods others are harmed 
by not having the same supply of goods available, 
thereby making it more difficult for them to obtain 
their basic goods. 
Interestingly, Henry Shue, in his book Basic Rights 
has made a similar argument in support of his ~ thesis 
that human beings are entitled to certain basic rights, 
including the right to subsistence. As noted before, 
he correctly shows that in a given society the supposed 
negative rights to security require numerous positive 
actions, e.g., police protection, courts, lawyers, etc. 
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He also argues, however, that the supposed positive 
rights to subsistence may only require that others re-
frain from depriving one of the opportunity to obtain 
basic goods, in much the same sense as Nozick. 
In regard to future generations my point here is 
that the present generation not only has an obligation 
to refrain from arbitrarily destroying the future 
generations' opportunity to obtain basic goods, but 
also that if such opportunity is destroyed, even by the 
legitimate actions of one obtaining one's own sub-
sistence, then the present generation must then take 
positive actions to compensate for this deprivation. 
But, here, our obligation only extends to the immedi-
ately succeeding generation. 
An interesting question not addressed here is 
whether one is obligated not only to provide goods 
which replace or compensate for what one has taken from 
the available supply, but also to perform actions to 
increase either the quantity or quality of the availa-
ble supply of goods for others regardless of one's 
previous actions. For example, suppose in our island 
case that the available fish supply consists of two 
distinct species, one of which contains much more of 
the islander's essential nutrients. Suppose also that 
there is an ample supply of the other species to feed 
at least the first and second islanders along the cur-
rent, but that the nutritious species is not sufficient 
to feed either islander. Thus, although each islander 
can survive by eating the one species, they suffer some 
malnutrition. However, the first islander could 
develop the spawning beds to increase the supply of the 
nutritious fish. Is he obligated to do this, or if he 
does, is he obligated to produce more than he needs. 
Tentatively, I would say no, since the second and suc-
ceeding islanders could, all other things being equal, 
do the same. But if one supports a strong theory 
regarding rights to well-being, it may be that one is 
obligated to provide for others or to raise the quality 
of life of others if one is able to do so without much 
sacrifice on one's part. 1 do not resolve this con-
troversy here, because for my main point, even if one 
were obligated to do more than simply compensate, I 
think for the reasons stated in the text that it only 
makes sense to say that one is obligated to the immedi-
ately adjacent islander, or when applied to future gen-
erations one is obligated only to the immediately suc-
ceeding generation. 
1"Martin Golding, "Obligations to Future 
Generations," Monist, 56 (1972) p. 89. 
,9Martin Krieger, "What's Wrong with Plastic 
Trees," Science, 179 (1972) p. 446. 
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